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The economy is nearing or in recession. Of concern is the length and depth of that 
recession, and what it will do to agriculture. Recession is defined as two consecutive 
quarters of declining Gross National Product (GNP). 
Slide: National Economv: Contributors to Recession 
. 
Inflation, then tight money. 
Stagnating economy. 
Rising energy costs, Gulf crisis. 
Declining consumer confidence. 
Budget deficit. 
Each of these elements will influence GNP. 
A typical recession follows tightening of the money supply after a bout of inflation. 
lnfl'ltion (excluding food and energy prices) increased from a base rate of about 4% in 1987 
. .• 
to 5%-in the first three quarters of 1990. That wasn't much by early 1980's standards but 
was enough for the Federal Reserve to tighten the money supply. Money supply (M2) 
expanding 2% annually in 1990 isn't enough to keep the economy growing in 1991. 
.· 
Slide: Economic Growth and Inflation 
. 
A tendency toward stagflation (a combination of a stagnant economy and inflation) 
is apparent in the figure from the declining GNP growth rate associated with higher 
inflation. The figure illustrates that the economic boom (which began 8 years ago) is losing 
its momentum. The growth rate of the economy has slowed from approximately 5% in 1987 
to a less than 1 % average in the first two quarters of 1990. GNP was up a surprising 1.8% 
in the third quarter, but that number is the only good news among a lot of bad news. The 
number is likely to be revised downward. 
Rising energy costs absorb income which would have been used to purchase other 
commodities, and will further reduce economic growth. 
Slide: Consumer Confidence Index: The Conference Board 
~ '" 
Declining consumer confidence reduces expenditures for goods and services, slowing 
the economy. When tight mone;r supply and a stagnating economy are combined with rising 
energy costs and consumer concerns about the future prospects in the Middle East, it is not 
surprising that consumer confidence has fallen. The decline was rather steady in 1989 and 
the first seven months of 1990. 
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Slide: Federal Budget Deficit 
Higher taxes and lower federal expenditures called for by the October budget accord 
will reduce aggregate demand and slow the economy. Despite Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
legislation calling for a balanced budget by 1993, budget deficits for 1990 and 1991 are 
projected to be near all time highs even after the budget deficit reduction package. The 
October package is designed to reduce the budget deficit by nearly $500 billion over five 
years and by $40 billion in 1991. The package was designed to restore confidence in the 
ability of Congress and the executive to govern but the difficulties of reaching an agreement 
have thwarted that goal. On the other hand, reducing aggregate demand by reducing buying 
power in the economy on the eve of recession is not the way to get the economy moving 
again. 
Slide: Federal Debt as Percent of GNP 
• 
The federal debt was 57% of the GNP in 1990, far below the 127% recorded in 1946. 
However, the relative debt burden may be greater today. Massive domestic and foreign 
debt, inadequate savings and investment, stagnant productivity growth, intense economic 
competition from Japan and European Community as well as other factors all point to the 
federal debt as being of great concern today. Many American firms are over-leveraged. An 
economic downturn will cause many business failures which in turn will cause bank failures 
and further losses to deposit insurance. 
.• 
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Some signs point to a shallow recession followed by a slow and uneven economic 
recovery. These signs include the fact that inventories are not large, the stock market has 
not been substantially over-priced, inflation has been modest and hence does not need a big 
economic tightening to correct it, and (with luck) the oil price shock may be short-lived. 
Slide: Economic Outlook: Real GNP 
.· 
In summary, key predictions for 1991 are as follows: 
GNP - overall growth rate 1 % for 1991 but low to negative 
growth in first half. 
Unemployment - 6 to 7%. 
Inflation - 7% in early 1991, but falling to 5% by the end of the 
year. 






The recession influences agriculture primarily through interest rates, exchange rates, 




on agriculture through national income and unemployment. This contrasts with former 
times when demand for farm output was highly sensitive to income. An exception is beef 
which remains sensitive to income. 
Slide: Interest Rates: U.S. Government Securities 
Interest rates fell somewhat since early 1989 but increased modestly again as 1990 
wore on and the money supply was tight. Interest rates will moderate only a little despite 
the budget accord and the slowing economy. The Federal Reserve will need to continue 
tight money to avoid inflation brought on by petroleum price hikes and to retain foreign 
capital to finance the national debt. 
Slide: Exchange Rates: Trade-Weighted Value of the Dollar 
The dollar has fallen substantially since early 1985. It revived again slightly in 1989 
and then has fallen again. The change in the value of the dollar for any commodity depends 
on where it is sold. The value of the dollar for agricultural commodities has declined less 
than for other commodities because agricultural commodities are sold to countries which 
have not devalued very much with respect to the dollar. The major dollar devaluations have 
occurred in relation to Japanese and European currencies. Hence soybeans which are sold 
mostly to such developed countries have declined in value most in foreign exchange. Wheat 
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has declined least because much of it is sold to developing countries which have not 
devalued relative to the dollar. 
The "squares" in the slide for July 1990 indicate the exchange rate for farm 
commodities as of that date. Note that all of these squares lie above the aggregate 
exchange rate for all commodities. 
Slide: Trade Balance: 1980-1989 
Despite less decline in the exchange rate for agricultural than for other commodities 
since 1973, agriculture has performed better in international trade than other commodities. 
Other commodities especially show recent signs of a turnaround. The trade balance for 
nonagricultural commodities is becoming less negative and the trade balance for agricultural 
commodities is becoming more positive. The value of the dollar is likely to continue to 
remain low and keep U.S. commodities highly competitive in international markets. 
An offsetting problem is that a recession in the U.S. is "exported" by reducing our 
imports from other econorriies. This will slo!-V other economies which in turn will reduce 
their demand for U.S. farm and other exports. I project that U.S. farm exports will be down 
from the $40 billion in 1990 to $38 billion in 1991. Good harvests abroad in 1990 also 
contributed to this trend. 
The final factor to consider is off-farm income. Half of the income of U.S. farmers 
comes from off-farm sources. In Ohio, 75% of income comes from off-farm sources. 




opportunities for farmers to earn off-farm income. This is partly offset by more aggressive 
search for off-farm employment by farmers during recession. 
The Ohio economy has been performing a little better than the national economy in 
recent months. Recently, the state has had lower rates of unemployment than the nation. 
The structural adjustments that the Ohio economy has made since 1980 and the low value 
of the dollar will help the state's international competitiveness. Ohio may perform a little 




Key issues in new farm legislation are cropping flexibility, budget cuts, and the 
environment. 
Slide: Farm Policy: Cropping Flexibility 
The key feature of new farm legislation is cropping flexibility and budget cuts through 
the triple base plan. This feature has reduced the acres eligible for deficiency payments by 
15% -- with further cuts in store for later years. 
The first base is a farmer's traditional allowable acreage of program crops. The 
second or program base is that first base less land which must be diverted to soil conserving 
uses, which will be 15% of the base for wheat and 7.5% of the base for feed grains in 1991. 
7 
The third or payment base is the amount of the base on which farmer's receive payment, 
which is reduced by 15%. 
In addition to the triple-base plan, there is a flex base of up to 10% of the overall 
crop base. It gives the farmer the option to produce program or other crops on flex acres 
without losing program history or loan coverage but with loss of deficiency payments. That 
option won't get much use. Loan rates are available on program crops produced on flex 
acres or triple base flex acres. 
Target prices are maintained at 1990 levels. The 15% reduction in payment acres 
essentially means a 15% reduction in deficiency payments. In addition, after 1993 the 
deficiency payments will be based on prices in the twelve-month marketing year rather than 
the first 5 months as previously. 
The soybean marketing loan is another major new innovation. It provides a market 
loan of $5.02 per bushel but With a 2% loan assessment which reduces the effective 
marketing loan to $4.92 per bushel. Projections suggest that soybean prices will average 
above the marketing loan, but opportunities for planting soybeans on flex acres could result 
in a large crop, bringing the price below the marketing loan. The program will improve our 
international market share but will raise objections from competing exporters in South 
America. 
The changes in programs will provide considerable flexibility in programs which will 
allow gr.eater response to __ ma.tket incentives and opportunities to pursue soil conserving 
rotations. 
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Slide: Farm Policy: Budget Cuts 
Projections are for $13.6 billion of federal savings compared with continuation of the 
1990 farm bill. Farm income is expected to be down a like amount over five years. While 
the reduction to $42 billion of program outlays represents a 25% cut from continuation of 
.• 
1990 programs, it represents nearly a 50% real cut in overall supports when inflation is 
factored in. Use of the twelve-month market price average to compute deficiency payments 
after 1993 is designed to further reduce deficiency payments and program costs. 
A problem with these changes is that program participation rates could drop, 
jeopardizing supply control features of the program. In addition, reducing U.S. supports 
ahead of GATI trade negotiations reduces our bargaining power. We will have already 
made the adjustments that we are trying to get the Europeans to agree to. However, the 
new farm bill contains significant outlays for export subsidies which will keep some pressure 
on the European Community. 
.· 
Slide: Farm Policv: Environment 
. 
The new farm bill has been widely touted as environmental legislation. It makes very 
modest additions to 1985 legislation, however. It provides for one million acres of wetland 
conversion through long-term crop easements, for moving the conservation reserve program 
to 40-45 million acres (the same as under 1985 farm legislation), and for nationwide organic 
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food standards and labeling. Pesticide record keeping requirements pose no immediate 
threat to farmers but could be used to control chemical use in future years. 
Thus far environmental provisions have emphasized the carrot of financial incentives 
to participate rather than the stick of mandatory participation. Apparently, the main victory 
for environmentalists in the 1990 farm bill was retention of sodbuster, swampbuster, and 
conservation compliance features of the 1985 farm bill. 
Farm Income and Finance 
Slide: 1991 Farm Income and Finance 
Gross cash farm income is projected to be down $3 billion from 1990 primarily 
because of lower exports and reduced deficiency payments. Expenses are projected to be 
up $2 billion in 1991 primarily because of rising energy costs. Net cash farm income is 
projected to be down $5 billion in 1991 from 1990. Because inventories are expected to 
accumulate less in 1991 than in 1990, net farm income is projected to be down $7 billion 
from 1990. 
.. 
Slide: Real U.S. Gross Cash Farm Income 
High real net farm income realized in recent years did not come from rising U.S. real 
gross cash farm income. In real terms, crop receipts declined in the first half of the 1980s 
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and have remained rather steady since the mid-1980s. Livestock receipts have performed 
better. Government payments and other income increased to the mid-198.Ds and then have 
decreased. Overall gross cash farm income fell io the mid-1980s and since then has held 
rather steady. 
Slide: Real U.S. Farm Production Exvenses 
.. 
Farmers have made impressive reductions in farm production expenses. That is 
particularly apparent in the case of interest outlays and manufactured inputs (outlays for 
fertilizer, fuel, and pesticides). Falling land prices and declining interest rates account for 
the reduced interest expenses. Higher petroleum prices will increase manufactured input 
expenses in 1991. Thus the significant downturn in production expenses apparent since 1980 
is expected to reverse in 1991. 
Slide: Real Farm Income and Exvenses: 1980-1990 
.. 
Production expenses have fallen more than gross farm income, leaving steady to 
increasing real net farm income in the last half of the 1980s. 
The new farm bill makes farm income more dependent on markets and less on the 
government. Farm markets are expected to remain stronger in 1991 and beyond than in the 
mid-1980s. However, the farm economy is expected to be less prosperous in the early 1990s 
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than in the late 1980s and 1990. I do not anticipate a return to financial stress similar to 
that experienced in the mid-1980s, however. 
Slide: Farm Balance Sheet 
.• 
Real farm assets fell sharply in the first half of the 1980s and then leveled off in 
value. Debt has declined steadily but by more modest amounts overall. The result is a 
fairly favorable net worth position for farmers as they stand on the threshold of 1991. 
The debt-asset ratio of 15% in 1990 is expected to continue unchanged in 1991. 
Slide: Farm Balance Sheet Ratios 
Farm asset values (especially land prices) are expected to decline slightly in 1991 
primarily because of reduced net farm income and uncertainties about the future. The 
.· 
decline would be larger except for the favorable momentum toward higher land prices 
carried ever from recent years. Debt is expected to remain nearly stable and net worth is 
expected to decline modestly. 
Debt-to-asset and debt-to-net-cash-income ratios are far more favorable in 1990 than 
in earlier years of the 1980s. Thus the farming economy will be "lean and trim" entering a 
period of relative austerity in government commodity programs. This permits farmers to 
survive financially on less gross income than in earlier years. Financial vulnerability, defined 
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as farms with debt to asset ratios of over 40% and negative cash flow, has declined from 
12% in 1984 to 5% today. 
Given anticipated future cuts in farm program payment base and lower deficiency 
payments, it is apparent that the future of agriculture will depend very heavily on markets, 
particularly export markets. Agriculture will remain strong in 1991 but will not do as well 
as in 1990. 
Rarely has a farm economy faced so much uncertainty. Specific forecasts have more 
than the usual range of error around them because of these many unce_.rtainties. If war 
breaks out in the Gulf or if recession is worldwide and deep, all bets and forecasts are off. 
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